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STAKEHOLDERS AND SUSTAINABILITY: AN ARGUMENT
FOR RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE DECISION-MAKING
TARA J. RADIN*
INTRODUCTION
It has been argued that the problems in corporate America today
stem from the failure of corporate law.' In general, the claim is that cor-
porate law fails to provide adequate incentives for appropriate behavior.2
In part, this is due to the fact that corporate law has remained virtually
stagnant since its inception more than a century ago, even though society
* Tara J. Radin teaches Legal Studies and Ethics at The Wharton School of the
University of Pennsylvania.
1 Kent Greenfield, Professor of Law, Boston College, Remarks at the William & Mary
Marshall Wythe School of Law Environmental Law and Policy Review Symposium:
Corporate Governance (Feb. 4, 2006). See also KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILuRE OF
CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE PossIBiLITIEs (forthcoming Jan.
2007). But see Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, Triumph or Tragedy? The Curious
Path of Corporate Disclosure Reform in the U.K, 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV.
317 (2007) [hereinafter Williams & Conley, Triumph or Tragedy] (arguing that disclosure
requirements can help compensate for inadequacies in the current legal framework). See
generally Kathleen Hale, Note, Corporate Law and Stakeholders: Moving Beyond Stake-
holder Statutes, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 823,827-28 (2003) (arguing for the creation and strength-
ening of "stakeholder statutes"); Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, An Emerging
Third Way? The Erosion of the Anglo-American Shareholder Value Construct, 38 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 493, 500-02 (2005) [hereinafter Williams & Conley, Emerging Third Way].
2 Professor Greenfield also argues that corporate law runs amiss in purposefully exclud-
ing non-stockholder constituents (stakeholders) from the governance process. See Kent
Greenfield, Does Corporate Law Protect the Interests of Shareholders and Other Stakeholders?
September 11th and the End of History for Corporate Law, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1409 (2002).
By law and norm, the corporation cares about one thing, money. Any-
thing that is not money is set aside unless it is in service of that one
thing. Instead of creating a governance system that would help inter-
nalize the concerns of society in general, or ofcustomers, or ofemployees,
the system of corporate governance in the United States sets up share-
holder interests as supreme and centralizes decision making so that
those interests are served. Other stakeholders are left to depend on
mechanisms external to the firm--contract and regulation-both seri-
ously imperfect, to protect their interests.
Id. at 1416. This arguably impairs corporate operations in that emphasizing short-term
profits often runs counter to long-term interests, including profitability.
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and its expectations have ostensibly changed.3 American corporate laws,
therefore, do not provide the sort of guidance that businesses today need.4
This argument is especially troublesome in the context of the natural
environment, especially with regard to the deterioration of the biosphere
and the depletion of natural resources. In some circumstances, the law
is emerging as a possible solution,5 and many people claim that, at least
in the United States,6 the legislature should intervene 7 to motivate corp-
orations to be more environmentally responsible.'
While it is true that the legal system in the United States is exten-
sive, it is also true that it is flawed. The system is largely reactive, and it
lacks the ability to anticipate and prevent corporate wrongdoing. Perhaps
this is as it should be. The recent failures of corporate America-as evidenc-
ed by the events leading to the downfall of Enron, WorldCom, and elsewhere
-are not the fault of the legal system,9 but of corporate managers'
' By "remained virtually stagnant," what is meant is that the key legal principles have
remained constant with little variation. See Kent Greenfield, New Principles for Corporate
Law, 1 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 87,87 (2005) [hereinafter Greenfield, New Principles for Corp-
orate Law]. Even though constituency statutes were passed beginning in the 1980s, they
have neither been applied nor challenged in any meaningful way. See infra Part II.B.3.
4 This is particularly true with regard to social issues. See Lynn Sharp Paine, Law, Ethics,
and Managerial Judgment, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. EDUC 15 (1994) [hereinafter Paine, Ethics
and Managerial Judgment] ("[L]aw is most often a lagging indicator of social ethics.").
' See generally Steven Ferrey, The Eagles of Deregulation: The Role of the Courts in a
Restructured Environment, 32 ENvTL. L. 297 (2002) (discussing the positive role of the legal
system in promoting protection of the environment).
6See, e.g., Williams & Conley, Emerging Third Way, supra note 1 ("Moreover, the United
States and the UK both exhibit a form of shareholder capitalism, under which the purpose
of the corporation is to maximize shareholder wealth, in contrast to the European stake-
holder view, according to which managers need to balance the interests of multiple con-
stituencies when making decisions.").
7 See id. at 494 (pointing out that Europe has adopted a much more progressive view of
corporate governance than exists in the United States and is more receptive to managerial
decision-making that incorporates consideration of stakeholder concerns).
'There are at least two different views regarding how legislation should approach environ-
mental protection. On the one hand, Robert Hahn and Robert Stavins argue in favor of
introducing positive incentives to encourage organizations to engage in environmentally-
responsible decision-making. See Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based
Environmental Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1991).
Cindy Schipani, on the other hand, points to the potential liability-including criminal
liability-that can accompany environmental irresponsibility. See Cindy A. Schipani,
Taking it Personally: Shareholder Liability for Corporate Environmental Hazards, 27 J.
CORP. L. 29, 62 (2001).
9 But cf Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP.
U. L. REV. 21, 27-38 (2001) (arguing that a revised regulatory framework could prove
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abdication of their moral responsibilities. ° In short, had these com-
panies been managed properly, organizations would not have needed laws
to distinguish right from wrong. The same can be said with regard to man-
agers' sensitivity to and acknowledgment of their responsibility for the
natural environment."
This reflects deeper issues in society associated with the tension
between ethics and compliance. Ethics tends to be linked to both moral
and social issues, such as the effect of human conduct on the natural envi-
ronment, whereas compliance refers to adherence to society's accepted
rules and standards. 2 The importance of moral bearing versus attention
to law in issues of responsibility is manifest, for example, in the con-
fusion and frustration resulting from legislation such as Sarbanes-Oxley
(commonly referred to as "SOX")." With SOX, there has been a distinct
shift from ethics to compliance. 4 While ethics and compliance should
work hand in hand, the cumbersomeness and costliness of complying with
laws and regulations tend to create a shift away from ethics and toward
a compliance culture in many organizations.' 5 Put simply, organizations
become so preoccupied with compliance that they either de-emphasize
or completely fail to acknowledge or address their moral responsibilities. 6
effective in increasing environmentally responsible behavior, suggesting that the problem
is not with legal regulation in general, but with the implementation of the current regu-
latory model).
" The responsibility for corporate behavior lies with the corporations themselves and with
society for not creating adequate incentives for different behavior. Kathleen Hale, supra
note 1, at 826.
" This was Ray Anderson's premise in changing the direction of his company, Interface,
Inc. He asserted that it was simply the right thing to do. See RAY C. ANDERSON, MID-
COURSE CORRECTION: TOWARD A SUSTAINABLE ENTERPRISE: THE INTERFACE MODEL (1998).
See infra Part IV.C.
12 See David Bell, Work-Life Resource Center, As We See It Working with Integrity: Ethics
for the UCSF Community (Sept. 2006), http://www.ucsf.edu/wrklife/pdf/Integrity-Sept
%202006.pdf.
13 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C. (2007)).
4 See Seymour Trachimovsky, Sarbanes-Oxley and Canadian Counterparts:Any Prospects
for Improved Corporate Ethics?, MGMT. ETHICS, Fall 2003, at 1, available at http://www
.ethicscentre.ca/EN/Fall2003.pdf.
" See Oliver Williams, Focus On Ethics Can Dispel Cynicism, BUS. DAY, July 2, 2004,
http'//www.nd.edu/ucba/011221/press/2004/07_ethicswilliams.shtml ("Perhaps the most
dramatic example of new transaction costs for business is the 2002 US Sarbanes-Oxley
law: it has raised auditing expenses by 200%-300%.").
" This is disappointing in that good ethics training enables companies to spend less time
on compliance. Compliance is about following rules. Ethics, on the other hand, is about
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This is a problem because organizations inundated with compliance issues
are often ill-prepared to address unanticipated, morally-questionable situ-
ations when they arise. To respond to complex business issues-to deal
with crises such as 9/11, for example-businesses and their managers
must be able to exercise proper judgment without over-reliance on the
law." This is especially true with regard to situations involving the nat-
ural environment, which are inherently complex and defy complete cov-
erage by the law.
Indeed, concern for the natural environment has become a pivotal
issue for businesses today."i Companies have found that legislative ap-
proaches go only so far in assisting managers in dealing with the com-
plexity of the natural environment and have come to rely more and more
heavily on managerial discretion in dealing with it and the laws governing
it. 9 Managers, in turn, increasingly need to be able to interpret and apply
existing environmental laws appropriately and responsibly. Moreover, it
is essential that they develop discretion because there is no formula-
no single, universal rule-that will enable them to deal effectively with
their concerns. Managers instead must navigate uncharted territory by
weighing competing interests to determine how to address challenging
business issues involving the natural world. All this means is that there
is less need for regulation and more need for managers to have a clear
making responsible decisions even in the absence of rules. If people are trained and en-
couraged to make well-reasoned decisions on their own, then, in most situations, their
decisions will be consistent with existing rules. In other words, if organizations invest
in ethics training, they should not need to spend as much time on compliance because it
follows naturally. See Lynn Sharp Paine, Managing for Organizational Integrity, HARV.
Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 106. In this seminal article, reprinted in numerous business
ethics textbooks, Professor Paine distinguishes between managing for "compliance" and
managing for "integrity." Id. at 106. She contends that a key difference lies in that empha-
sizing integrity results in responsible conduct beyond mere compliance with rules, regu-
lations, policies and laws. Id. at 106-07. "The payoff is a work force better educated in the
law. Trained employees can be cost-effective."Mark Voorhees,All Training, All the Time,
NAT'L L.J., Jan. 24, 2000, at B8.17 See Tara J. Radin, 700 Families to Feed: The Challenge of Corporate Citizenship, 36 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 619,665-70 (2003) [hereinafter Radin, 700 Families to Feed] (describing
some of the ways in which organizations reached out to one another in the wake of tragedy).
' See ROGENE A. BuCHHoLZ, PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT: THE GREENING
OF BUSINESS (1993). See generally Benjamin J. Richardson, Enlisting Institutional Investors
in Environmental Regulation: Some Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives, 28 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 247, (2002) (emphasizing the consequences of business decisions to
the natural environment).
9 See Richardson, supra note 18, at 248.
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understanding of ethics and a sense of responsibility for the influence of
their businesses on the natural environment.
It is important to keep in mind at this point that corporate man-
agers are not creatures set apart from society and the natural world. They
have the same interest as other living creatures in preserving the bio-
sphere. While managers are charged with responsibility for the directions
that companies take, managers are at the same time living organisms,
as well as customers, employees, and stockholders of the companies they
serve. Attending to social issues such as the environment thus translates
into reconciling concerns shared with other living organisms as well as
with the firm's various constituents or stakeholders. This is not to say
that every manager feels the same about the natural environment or
issues involving it, but that, in aggregate, managers have a vested interest
in the preservation of the natural environment, as all other' living crea-
tures do and the corporation's stakeholders do as well.2"
It seems, then, that responsible organizational decision-making
in response to concerns relating to the natural environment is critical.2'
Accordingly, Part I of this Article argues against a legislative approach
to protecting the environment 2 2 and claims that the ever-increasing pro-
mulgation of rules and regulations results in an unhelpful, compliance-
driven culture that is excessively expensive, time-consuming, and cum-
bersome in application.23 It will also show that this kind of approach
represents a distraction from the sort of creative thinking that brings about
innovations beneficial to business, society, and the natural environment.
20 Instead of contributing to the already existing morass of regulatory entanglements
(particularly with regard to environmental regulation), we, as a society, need to send the
clear message that we care, provided that we do in fact care. If the purpose of legislation
is to protect societal interests, we need to show that the environment is something that
matters to our society.21 This thinking is similar to the argument articulated by Tara Radin and Martin Calkins
with regard to global labor practices. They assert that one way to change behavior is to provide
more positive role models. See Tara J. Radin & Martin Calkins, The Struggle Against Sweat-
shops: Moving Toward Responsible Global Business, J. OF Bus. ETHICS 261, 269-71 (2006).22 But see Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics to Show the Power and Efficiency
of Corporate Law as Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581,640-44 (2002) (arguing that
corporate law can serve as a valuable regulatory tool); Cynthia Williams, Text of Remarks
on Panel: "Codes of Conduct and Transparency," 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 415
(2001) (emphasizing the importance and value of monitoring corporate behavior).
'But see David W. Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting as Informational Regulation:
A Law and Economics Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 379,379-81(2005); David B. Spence,
The Shadow of the Rational Polluter: Rethinking the Role of Rational Actor Models in
Environmental Law, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 917, 918 (2001).
2007] 367
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL*Y REV.
This Part also demonstrates how excessive legislation threatens to
preclude organizations from developing and instituting new processes and
procedures. Examples from accounting, with regard to Sarbanes-Oxley,24
illustrate the huge costs associated with compliance that can cause organi-
zations to become so bogged down that they are effectively prevented from
doing anything out of the ordinary beyond mere compliance.
Part II suggests that an approach involving increased reliance on
managerial responsibility is preferable to a legislative approach and
consistent with a widely accepted stakeholder view of the firm. Although
corporate law has traditionally emphasized stockholder primacy,25 current
thinking about the law and the role of business in society emphasizes
attention to stakeholder considerations.26 Moreover, present American
law (specifically, the business judgment rule) not only grants managers
considerable discretion as to the sources that they may consider to influence
their decision-making,27 today's so-called "corporate law" (and "law" more
generally conceived) is replete with stakeholder-specific legislation that
prioritizes various interests and concerns over profit generation.2" Re-
framing our understanding of the firm in accordance with a stakeholder-
based relationship view is therefore consistent with both underlying
legal principles and societal interests.
Having established the importance of a stakeholder approach to
business and corporate law, Part III turns to concerns linked to the nat-
ural environment and explains the notion of "sustainability"29 and the
24 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C. (2007)).
25 The law previously favored a stockholder view of the firm, and was traditionally viewed
as a hurdle for managers to overcome when making decisions that might even appear to
run counter to profit-maximization. See infra Part II.A.26 See infra Part II.C.
27 Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, Is There an Emerging Fiduciary Duty to
Consider Human Rights?, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 75 (2005) [hereinafter Williams & Conley,
Human Rights] ("According to the majority of corporate law professors in the United
States, a corporation's primary, and possibly exclusive, goal is to maximize shareholder
wealth within the confines of the law.").2 8 See infra Part II.B.3.
29 See PAUL HAWKEN, THE ECOLOGY OF COMMERCE: A DECLARATION OF SUSTAINABILITY
(1993).
Sustainability is an economic state where the demands placed upon the
environment by people and commerce can be met without reducing the
capacity of the environment to provide for future generations. It can
also be expressed in the simple terms of an economic golden rule for
the restorative economy: Leave the world better than you found it, take
368 [Vol. 31:363
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interconnectedness of the natural environment with social and economic
development."0 This Part also challenges the legal permissibility of mana-
gerial decision-making that neglects this interconnectedness, and proffers
a normative and descriptive framework to assist managers in addressing
issues of sustainability effectively and successfully.
Finally, Part IV illustrates the ways in which a proper response to
environmental concerns not only coheres with the law, but also leads to
certain best practices in business. Part IV also offers examples of indiv-
iduals and organizations that have distinguished themselves as leaders in
the area of sustainability. The Article then concludes by emphasizing the
shared positive bottom line for businesses, communities, and society in
general that occurs when organizations and their managers approach
sustainability responsibly and proactively.
I. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST EXCESSIVE LEGISLATION
Society's inclination when addressing common problems-partic-
ularly those related to perceived threats-is to legislate solutions. While
this provides the consolation of doing something rather than nothing, it
does not always bring about optimal solutions. At a minimum, it results
in a bloated legal system such as the one that exists today. Even so, the
current legal framework does provide significant benefits, including sup-
port and direction (positive and negative) for corporations.3
no more than you need, try not to harm life or the environment, make
amends if you do.
Id. at 139; see also David Monsma & John Buckley, Non-Financial Corporate Performance:
The Material Edges of Social and Environmental Disclosure, 11 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 151,
170 (2004) ("The terms .'sustainable development' or 'environmental sustainability' are
now well established in the lexicon of environmentalism."). But cf. THINKING ECOL-
OGICALLY: THE NEXT GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (Marian R. Chertow &
Daniel C. Esty eds., 1997) (explaining how "sustainability" differs from traditional
approaches to concerns about the natural environment).
" See Allen L. White, Sustainability and the Accountable Corporation, 41 ENV'T 30 (1999)
(explaining how sustainability is not an oxymoron as it might seem); see also Surya Deva,
Sustainable Good Governance and Corporations: An Analysis of Asymmetries, 18 GEO.
INT'L ENVTL. L. Rev. 707,708 ("Sustainable good governance, a paradigmatic fusion of two
buzzwords, 'sustainable development' and 'good governance,' is a new emerging currency.");
Judith Perhay, The Natural Step: A Scientific and Pragmatic Framework for a Sustainable
Society, 33 S.U. L. REV. 249 (2006).31 See, e.g., Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill ofRights,
41 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 580-81 (1990) (pointing out that corporate law is only one source
of legal restrictions and protections for corporations; for example, the Bill of Rights applies
to corporations).
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Two prominent examples of legislative solutions offered in re-
sponse to troublesome societal situations are the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines ("Guidelines") of the 1980s32 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002."3 In the wake of corporate wrongdoing and lack of self-restraint,
Congress responded in both situations with legislation aimed at compel-
ling responsible decision-making.
The Guidelines accomplished this task initially to some degree by
treating organizations more favorably if they had instituted ethical codes
of conduct.' The Guidelines do not, however, distinguish between organi-
zations with effective ethics programs and organizations with ethics pro-
grams in name only.
SOX was similarly passed because of widespread concern about
increased corporate crime, but this time in response to a barrage of major
corporate accounting scandals involving companies such as Enron, Tyco
International, and WorldCom.35 SOX effectively created a new set of ac-
counting rules for publicly-held companies.36 The primary goal of SOX was
to create a heightened level of transparency and accountability for cor-
porations.37 It demands that companies meet new financial reporting stan-
dards, many of which entail increased oversight by public accountants. 38
This is particularly evident in Section 404, which details "[m] anagement
assessment of internal controls."39 According to this provision, upper man-
agement must not only certify the accuracy of financial statements, but
must also take responsibility for any inaccuracies in those statements.40
Complying with Section 404 has translated into billions of dollars in
32 See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-59, 3561-66, 3571-74, 3581-86, & 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98
(2006)). The sentencing guidelines were established to create uniformity in sentencing
practices and provided for reduced fines and avoidance of sanctions for multiple reasons,
such as the presence of a written code of ethics. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN
YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING 11-13 (2004), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
15year/chapl.pdf. See also Elletta Sangrey Callahan et al., Integrating Trends in
Whistleblowing and Corporate Governance: Promoting Organizational Effectiveness,
Societal Responsibility, and Employee Empowerment, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 177 (2002).
33 Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C. (2007)).
See supra note 32.
35Robert Prentice, Enron: A Brief Behavioral Autopsy, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 417,440-41 (2003).36 Id.
37 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 32, at 11-13.
' Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404. See Prentice, supra note 35, at 441-43.
31 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404.
4 Id.
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increased costs, primarily for new technology and internal control
systems.4 In the financial services industry alone, for example, companies
are finding that the amount of time they spend on compliance is
dwarfing time being spent actually doing business.42
A similar phenomenon has emerged in the context of environ-
mental regulation. Regulations have again proliferated and taken on a
life of their own. The situation has become one where, as Michael Ray
Harris points out, "[t]raditional environmental regulation has proven
inadequate in resolving our country's environmental problems."' Cynthia
A. Williams echoes this sentiment with her concern that organizations no
longer consider what is responsible; instead, she contends, they now
assess regulation in terms of the cost of compliance versus the cost of
penalties associated with non-compliance.'
In addition, today's regulatory framework has become so complex
that it seems intimidating to some companies.45 This means that some
organizations could be spending more time on compliance than on the bus-
iness at hand. As Lucia Ann Silecchia points out, even the "good" compan-
ies are having trouble keeping up with all of the regulations: " [M]any say
that even 'good' companies cannot possibly be in compliance with all en-
vironmental statutes and regulations."46 All of this suggests that businesses
and the societies in which they operate would do well to figure out ways
4 See Paula L. Green, Costly Compliance, GLOBAL FIN., Apr. 2005, httpJ/www.gfinag.com/
2005/Apr/cci/fe_art05.php.
42 Id.
41 Michael Ray Harris, Promoting Corporate Self-Compliance: An Examination of the
Debate Over Legal Protection for Environmental Audits, 23 ECOLOGYL.Q. 663,664 (1996).
' This is known as "law-as-price" theory. Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Compliance
with the Law in the Era of Efficiency, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1265 (1998). Professor Williams,
however, is not opposed to increased regulation. In fact, she advocates mandatory social
reporting. See Williams & Conley, Triumph or Tragedy, supra note 1.
4 See Spence, supra note 23, at 931.
Critics charge that the environmental regulatory apparatus is so complex
that compliance with regulatory requirements is unreasonably difficult.
In a recent survey of corporate environmental managers, nearly half
reported that their most time- and energy-consuming duty is trying to
determine whether their companies are in compliance with the law, with
seventy percent believing perfect compliance is impossible.
Id.
46 Lucia Ann Silecchia, Ounces of Prevention and Pounds of Cure: Developing Sound
Policies for Environmental Compliance Programs, 7 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 583, 590-91
n.14 (1996). See also Harris, supra note 43, at 666 (noting the types of costs associated
with compliance).
2007]
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to tilt the scales away from excessive legislation so that companies can
pay more attention to their core businesses.
Further complicating matters is the increasing globalization of
business. As a result of the internet and the growing mobility of people
of means, few major corporations today can afford to limit their business
dealings to a single geographic region.47 Such sprawl creates significant
obstacles for legislative approaches to problems, as legislators and regu-
lators must take into account the presence of multinational competitors
to whom the rules might not apply.4" This can undermine the effective-
ness of local legislation and impede the competitiveness of locally-based
corporations in the global marketplace.49
Even if these hurdles are overcome, there remains significant
concern that the regulations will replace independent business decision-
making. Some people maintain that the Guidelines, initially intended to
promote integrity, at least initially facilitated a retreat into mere com-
pliance."° The argument here is that compliance replaced good business
judgment as compliance cultures became the norm and stifled moral
imagination5 and true business leadership.
The seriousness of the ramifications of this shift can be seen in
corporate responses to certain recent crises. In these types of situations,
successful and inspirational responses are self-initiated, not mandated
from outside. 2 In the early aftermath of 9/11, businesses reached out to
47 See, e.g., Richardson, supra note 18, at 273 ("The globalization ofbanking, insurance, and
investment services has diminished the power of governments to regulate institutions.").
48 See, e.g., Cynthia A. Williams, Civil Society Initiatives and "Soft Law" in the Oil and
Gas Industry, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 457, 457 (2004) ("One of the persistent con-
cerns in discussions of corporate accountability over the last decade has been the mismatch
between transnational business enterprises and national systems of legal control.").
4' This was, in fact, one of the early criticisms of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
See generally Diane Caggiano, Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: The Case for
Multilateral Cooperation, 5 NEw ENG. INT'L & COMP. L. ANN. (1999), http://www.nesl.edu/
intljournal/vol5/caggiano.htm.
50 Paine, Ethics and Managerial Judgment, supra note 4. See also David Hess et al., The
2004 Amendments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Their Implicit Call for a
Symbiotic Integration of Business Ethics, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 725, 726 (2006)
(arguing that the changes to the Guidelines, which went into effect on November 1, 2004
"set the benchmark for proper corporate conduct" by emphasizing organizational culture
above mere programs and initiatives).
51 The term "moral imagination" refers to the process of developing creative solutions to
common problems. See, e.g., PATRICIA H. WERHANE, MORAL IMAGINATION AND MANAGEMENT
DECISION-MAKING (1999).
52 See generally Radin, 700 Families to Feed, supra note 17, at 650-5 1.
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one another, for example, by opening their doors to share space with clients
or competitors even before the government had time to react.5" The same
held true after the devastation of Hurricane Katrina.54 Again, businesses
pitched in before government bureaus could activate effectively. For exam-
ple, Wal-Mart got necessary supplies to victims quickly while promising dis-
placed employees jobs at other locations.55 In addition, Wal-Mart set up a gift
registry through which storm victims could register for needed items and fam-
ily, friends, and caring strangers could direct their donations appropriately.56
The inclination to rely on laws to resolve society's problems ironi-
cally might stem from management approaches that endeavor to
disassociate individuals from their personal values; the most effective
management approaches seem to be those that draw upon the values of
individuals deeply invested in such problems.57 The same holds true for
businesses, which have admittedly been slow to adapt.5"
" See Families and Work Institute, Employer Response to September 11 Tragedy, http://
www.familiesandwork.org/announce/EmployerResponses.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2007)
(listing companies' responses to 9/11).
' This is not to suggest that everyone rose to the occasion following Hurricane Katrina,
but there are notable examples of companies that did. See, e.g., Cisco Systems, Inc., Cisco
and Society: Crisis Relief, http://www.cisco.com/web/abouttac227/ac222/society/crisis-relief/
(last visited Mar. 1, 2007) (discussing Cisco's response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita).
Cisco President and CEO John Chambers said: "I believe that those corporations that are
most successful have an obligation to give back to the communities in which they oper-
ate .... Cisco is committed to being a good corporate citizen. It is not just the right thing
to do-it is also good for business." News Release, Cisco Systems, Inc., Good Citizenship
Benefits Corporate Bottom Line (Nov. 7, 2005), http://newsroom.cisco.comldlls/2005/
corp-l10705.html?CMP=AF17154. See also The Pharmacy at Wal-Mart: Community
Support: Wal-Mart Steps Up in Time of Need, CHAIN DRUG REv., Jul. 24,2006, at 65 (detail-
ing Wal-Mart's support of New Orleans following the devastation by Hurricane Katrina).
"
5See Brian Grow,A Wal-Mart Becomes a Lifeline, Bus. WK. ONLINE, Sept. 7,2005, http:ll
www.businessweek.comlbwdaily/dnflash/sep2005/nf2005097_1818_db017.htm.
6 Press Release, Wal-Mart, Wal-Mart Opens Gift Registry for Hurricane Katrina Victims
(Sept. 12, 2005), http://www.walmartfacts.com/articles/1977.aspx.
57 One of the unfortunate themes that has traditionally characterized business is that of
a disconnect between wealth creation and personal values, with the customary view
being that personal values should not enter the workplace. In an address delivered at the
University of Hartford's 1991 annual convocation, Ben Cohen, co-founder of Ben & Jerry's
ice cream, criticized the prevailing focus on profits by most of corporate America and the
implicit expectation that employees "check their values at the door every day when they
come to work." Mary Agnes Carey, Ice Cream King Has Taste for Human Needs; Human
Needs Flavor Ice Cream King's Talk, HARTFORD COURANT, Sept. 12, 1991, at D1. Cohen
went on to say that "[a]side from money, business is valueless .... It seems to be if an
individual has a responsibility to the community, businesses, which are a collection of
individuals, have a responsibility to the community." Id.
18 See DEBRAE. MEYERSON, TEMPERED RADICALS: HOW PEOPLE USE DIFFERENCE TO INSPIRE
CHANGE AT WORK (2001) (asserting that employees do not have to check their values at
the door to keep their jobs).
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During the past decade, many of the companies that have distin-
guished themselves are those that recognize the inherent value people
bring to their organizations by not checking their personal values at the
door, but by allowing their personal values to influence business decision-
making in new and creative ways.59 This only makes sense; organiza-
tions hire people because of their particularized skill sets and personali-
ties. For individuals to attempt to make decisions without reference to
such factors is to deprive organizations of the qualities for which those
specific individuals were hired.6"
Although the law might be blind, we want our business organiza-
tions and their managers to be anything but blind. Instead of legislating
the bottom line, it seems to make sense-morally, legally, and in terms
of good and successful business thinking-to rely on firms to choose for
themselves how they will respond to the hurdles associated with the nat-
ural environment and the finiteness of natural resources.61 The challenge,
" See Laura Koss-Feder, The Good Works Perk, TIME, Jan. 22, 2001, at B1, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,95235,00.html (identifying footwear
manufacturer Timberland as a leading company). According to Ken Freitas, Vice President
of Marketing for Social Enterprise, people seeking jobs at Timberland "realize that you
don't have to check your values at the door when you join this company." See also Oliver
Williams, supra note 15 ("Business leaders are first of all human beings and only second-
arily managers of wealth creation. To check your human values at the office door is to
invite chaos. This is one lesson we have learned in the past five years.").
60 See Seyla Benhabib, The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan
Controversy and Moral Theory, in WOMEN AND MORAL THEORY 154 (Eva F. Kittay & Diana
T. Meyers eds., 1987).
61 But see Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227 (1995)
[hereinafter Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law]; Eric W. Orts, A Reflexive Model of
Environmental Regulation, Bus. ETHiCs Q., Oct. 1995, at 779 [hereinafter Orts,A Reflexive
Model] ("[A] theory of reflexive law proposes an alternative approach to law reform. It
focuses on enhancing self-referential capacities of social systems and institutions outside
the legal system, rather than direct intervention of the legal system itself through agencies,
highly detailed statutes, or delegation of great power to courts."). Instead of avoiding legis-
lation, Professor Orts argues in favor of a reflexive model, which enlists "intermediate
social institutions" in the effort of regulation. Contrasted with the traditional command-
and-control model, it is valuable in that it links the key stakeholders involved with
potential solutions to the problem. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, supra, at 1232.
"Reflexive environmental law ... seeks to tie businesses, which are a major source of
many environmental problems, more closely to environmental solutions."Id. at 1338-39.
This sort of legislative approach would be preferable to alternative legislative approaches,
but even Professor Orts proffers it as an "ideal type." Id. at 1252. The non-legislative ap-
proach is thus proposed in this paper as a viable and real alternative. However aspira-
tional it appears, it provides a starting point for businesses and an opportunity for them
to take charge of their relationships with the natural environment instead of waiting for
a suitable legislative answer.
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it seems, lies in finding ways to create incentives and motivate managers to
draw upon their own moral resources when addressing business concerns
such as these.
II. VIEWS OF THE FIRM
Determining how to create these sorts of incentives and motivational
tools-those that allow and encourage managers to draw upon their own
values and talents--depends upon how the firm is viewed. Expectations of
corporations are inherently colored by mental models and preconceptions
regarding the nature of the firm and its role in society.62 The prevalent
view of the firm characterizes it as merely a vehicle for profit maximiza-
tion.6 3 A more robust understanding of the firm-one that captures the
full range of relationships in which the firm is embedded-provides the
foundation for a potentially non-legalistic response to business problems,
including those involving the natural environment and sustainability.
A. Stockholder View of the Firm
The traditional view of the firm prioritizes stockholders, as illus-
trated by Figure 1.64 During the mid- to late-1960s, businesspeople
increasingly began challenging the role of the manager with regard to pre-
scribed non-involvement in matters deemed "social," such as pollution,
inflation, and poverty.65 While these problems affect society as a whole,
some people have argued that businesses are better positioned than
individuals to tackle these types of concerns effectively and success-
fully.66 Advocates of the stockholder view of the firm have nevertheless
62 See PETER M. SENGE, THE FIFTH DISCIPLINE: THE ART AND PRACTICE OF THE LEARNING
ORGANIZATION 8-9 (1990) (suggesting that the aggregate of an individual's experiences
creates a "mental model" of inherent biases that color how he or she views the world); see
also PETER M. SENGE ETAL., THE FIFTH DISCIPLINE FIELDBOOK 235 (1994) ("Mental models
are the images, assumptions, and stories which we carry in our minds of ourselves, other
people, institutions, and every aspect of the world.").
' See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits,
N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept.13, 1970, at 32, 32-33.
' See, e.g., Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law,
109 HARV. L. REV. 1911 (1996); D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J.
CORP. L. 277 (1998).
" See generally Friedman, supra note 63 (responding to calls for business "social respon-
sibility").
' See Tara J. Radin, Stakeholder Theory and the Law (Aug. 1999) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Darden Graduate School of Business Administration, University of
Virginia) [hereinafter Radin, Stakeholder Theory and the Law] (on file with author).
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maintained that it is not the place of managers of firms to dabble in
social responsibility. They contend that managers should-indeed they
are obligated to as a matter of fiduciary duty-focus on maximizing
stockholder returns.67
FIGURE 1
Stockholder View
Milton Friedman, a noted free-market economist, has been the chief
spokesman for this view, which he articulated most prominently in an
article that has for more than thirty years remained among the most
often cited references for the stockholder theory of the firm. The Social
Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits initially appeared in
the New York Times Magazine on September 13, 1970, and has subse-
quently been reprinted in a wide variety of sources.6" Interestingly, while
it was published in the popular press as a news article, it addresses, and
is tenable to, both scholars and practitioners, and remains the leading
encapsulation of the stockholder theory of firm management.
67 See Friedman, supra note 63.68 Id.
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In sum, Friedman denounces any discussion of "social responsibili-
ties" for business.69 As the investors, stockholders are entitled to the cor-
poration's residual profits.7 ° The interests of all other constituents are
preempted by preexisting arrangements.7' Profits are to be provided to
stockholders, just as products and services are delivered to customers,
paychecks are distributed to employees, and so on.72 Friedman concludes:
"[TIhere is one and only one social responsibility of business-to use its
resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long
as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open
and free competition without deception or fraud."73
Friedman's conclusion is echoed in the more recent opinion ex-
pressed by Albert Carr:
[A] s long as a company does not transgress the rules of the
game set by law, it has the legal right to shape its strategy
without reference to anything but profits. . . . A wise
business man will not seek advantage to the point where
he generates dangerous hostility among employees, com-
petitors, customers, government, or the public at large. But
decisions in this area are, in the final test, decisions of
strategy, not of ethics.74
This statement captures the underlying belief that has traditionally char-
acterized thinking about business: that business decisions are driven by
profits and only profits, and that ethics are virtually irrelevant (with the
exception of deception, fraud, and so on).7"
69 Id. at 33.
70 See id.
7' See id.
See id.
7 1 Id. at 124 (emphasis added).
7" Albert Z. Carr, Is Business Bluffing Ethical?, 46 HARv. Bus. REV. 143, 149 (1968)
(emphasis added).
75 See id. at 149.
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B. Evolution of Legal Thinking
Jurisprudence in the United States has involved at least a cen-
tury of debate about the nature of business and the significance of stock-
holders and other stakeholders. 76 The controversy between the common
law view-that the managers of a corporation serve only as fiduciaries
for stockholders-and the growing acceptance of obligations to non-
stockholder claimants actually came to the forefront in the early part of
the twentieth century.77 Since then, there has evolved a conflation of the
requirement that businesses have a profit-generating motive78 with the
perceived requirement that businesses (more properly, business manag-
ers) should focus on profit maximization.
1. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. 79
The stockholder view of the corporation asserts that corporations
are purely private enterprises with the single goal of wealth maximiza-
tion for the owners of shares.8" The idea here is that corporate funds are
limited and, if they are poured into philanthropic or other outside activ-
ities under the guise of doing something "socially responsible," funds are
not being directed toward their proper end (stockholder ownership).81
This is the view seemingly accepted by the court in the Dodge decision,
76 See Tara J. Radin, From Imagination to Realization: A Legal Foundation for Stakeholder
Theory, in 4 RE-IMAGINING BUSINESS ETHICS: MEANINGFUL SOLUTIONS FOR A GLOBAL
ECONOMY 31 (Moses Pava & Patrick Primeaux eds., 2002) [hereinafter Radin, From
Imagination to Realization] (discussing the evolution of legal thinking regarding
stockholders and other stakeholders).
17 See id.
" See Tuttle v. Buck, 119 N.W. 946 (Minn. 1909). The court in Tuttle held that a profit
motive is essential for an activity to be considered "business" in the eyes of the law:
To divert to one's self the customers of a business rival by the offer of
goods at lower prices is in general a legitimate mode of serving one's
own interest, and justifiable as fair competition. But when a man starts
an opposition place of business, not for the sake of profit to himself, but
regardless of loss to himself, and for the sole purpose of driving his com-
petitor out of business, and with the intention of himself retiring upon
the accomplishment of his malevolent purpose, he is guilty of a wanton
wrong and an actionable tort.
Id. at 948.
'9 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
o See Friedman, supra note 63, at 33.
s See id.
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where the court held that a corporation's primary purpose is profit maximi-
zation for the stockholders. 2 The court indicated that a corporation and
its managers owe a fiduciary duty to its stockholders, and that the cor-
poration's primary purpose is profit maximization for the stockholders. 3
In this decision, the court effectively nullified Henry Ford's discretionary
powers to use corporate profits for the benefit of employees and con-
sumers, for that interfered with profits being returned to stockholders. 4
2. Dodd vs. Berle Debate
In 1932, an ongoing debate between Merrick Dodd and Adolf A.
Berle, Jr., conducted in a series of articles published in the Harvard Law
Review, brought the controversy between stockholders and stakeholders
to greater public awareness. 5 In his article, Dodd argued that managers
act with the trust of the entire community, and that corporations provide
"a social service as well as a profit-making function" for society. 6 Man-
agers therefore have fiduciary obligations which, instead ofbeing limited
to stockholders, should extend to a broader range of constituents. These
constituents are now commonly referred to as the firm's "stakeholders.""7
82 Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684. In Dodge, the court held that the purpose of a corporation is
profit maximization:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the
profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed
for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice
of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the end
itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the nondistribution of profits
among stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes.
Id. at 684.
83 See id. at 683-85.
84Id.
5 See A. A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARVARD L. REV. 1049 (1931)
[hereinafter Berle, Corporate Powers]; A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers
Are Trustees:A Note, 45 HARv. L. REV. 1365, 1372 (1932) [hereinafter Berle, For Whom];
E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees? 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145,
1148 (1932).
88 See Dodd, supra note 85, at 1148.
87See id. at 1153-63. The words "stakeholders" and "constituents" tend to refer to the same
entities, though "stakeholder" is often interpreted more broadly. "Stakeholder," however,
is the word used most frequently by businesspeople, while "constituent" tends to appear
in legal drafting and literature. See infra Part II.C.
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Berle, in reply, argued that this sort of view of managers and cor
porations potentially opens the floodgates to widespread abuse.88 He con-
tended that, absent the legal obligation of managers to protect the financial
interests of their stockholders, there is a serious danger of managerial
indiscretion.89 Berle, therefore, cautioned against the notion of corporate
"social responsibility" because it does not fall within an appropriate scope
of corporate undertaking.9" As Berle notes:
Unchecked by present legal balances, a social-economic
absolutism of corporate administrators, even if benevo-
lent, might be unsafe; and in any case it hardly affords the
soundest base on which to construct the economic com-
monwealth which industrialism seems to require. Mean-
while.., we had best be protecting the interests we know,
being no less swift to provide for the new interests as they
successively appear.91
In the end, Berle's views prevailed, and courts and legislatures in the
United States since then have tended to subscribe to the position that
the maximization of stockholder wealth benefits stakeholders more than
alternate courses of action.92
This is not to say that Berle entirely "won." Although his position
seemed to prevail initially, scholars and practitioners have continued
to question the relationship between managers and constituents
(stakeholders). Indeed, Berle himself subsequently conceded the point
to Dodd more than twenty years later and noted: "[Miodern directors are
not limited to running business enterprise for maximum profit, but are in
fact and recognized in law as administrators of a community system."
93
Since the Dodd and Berle debate, business and law in the United
States have moved beyond the Dodge decision both in theory and practice.
' Berle, For Whom, supra note 85.
89 Id. at 1367-69.
90 Id. at 1367.
91 Id. at 1372.92 Id. at 1367-68. Berle goes on to say that because of the large amount of money invested
by many Americans in stock, representing the stockholder interest ultimately serves the
greater good. Id.
93 See A. A. Berle, Jr., Foreword to THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY, at xii (Edward
S. Mason ed., 1960). Berle clarified, however, that he was merely conceding that this was
the way the law developed, not that he believed it to be the "right" way. Id.
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Corporations clearly serve societal roles beyond pure stock-
holder wealth-maximization, with the tempered support of
both legislators and jurists. State and federal legislation
identifies and affords protection for competing concerns,
and judges often sanction unconventional corporate activ-
ities, as long as they cannot be construed as causing direct
interference with shareholder profits, by deferring to man-
agerial discretion.94
Although the Dodge decision has never officially been overturned, it has,
in practice, been set aside. It is no longer followed or accepted as binding
precedent; it is merely a landmark in legal theory.
3. Constituency Statutes
During the 1980s, many states gradually adopted "constituency
statutes."95 These statutes-drafted in virtually identical language-
expressly permit managers to consider the interests of certain "constit-
uents" (stakeholders) under certain circumstances.96 Although these
statutes have rarely, if ever, been applied, their emergence reflects a sig-
nificant and meaningful shift in legal thinking in that they acknowledge
the interests of non-stockholder constituents.
' Radin, 700 Families to Feed, supra note 17, at 647 (citation omitted). See Reed v. Burton,
73 N.W.2d 333, 336 (Mich. 1955).
It is not the function of the court to manage a corporation nor to sub-
stitute its own judgment for that of the officers thereof. It is only when
the officers are guilty of wilful abuse of their discretionary powers or
of bad faith or of neglect of duty or of perversion of the purpose of the
corporation or when fraud or breach of trust are involved that the court
will interfere.
Id. (citing Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919)).95 Radin, 700 Families to Feed, supra note 17, at 644 (citing Marjorie Kelly, Laws Require
Directors to Take Wider View on Takeover Offers, STAR TRmB., Nov. 27, 1995, at C1). See also
Joseph Biancalana, Defining the Proper Corporate Constituency:Asking the Wrong Question,
59 U. CIN. L. REV. 425 (1990); James J. Hanks, Jr., Playing with Fire: Nonshareholder
Constituency Statutes in the 1990s, 21 STETSON L. REV. 97 (1991); Katherine Van Wezel
Stone, Employees as Stakeholders Under State Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 21
STETSON L. REV. 45 (1991).
96 Radin, 700 Families to Feed, supra note 17, at 644. The emergence of constituency
statutes prompted a barrage of law review articles exploring their meaning. See, e.g.,
Timothy L. Fort, Corporate Constituency Statutes: A Dialectical Interpretation, 15 J.L. &
COM. 257 (1995) (considering the value of constituency statutes); Gary von Stange, Note,
Corporate Social Responsibility Through Constituency Statutes:Legend orLie?, 11 HOFSTRA
LAB. L. J. 461, 488 (1994) (explaining that stakeholders will have to be given standing to
sue to enforce their rights if constituency statutes are to have any merit).
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4. The Role of Fiduciary Duty
Another important consideration is the notion of fiduciary duty,
which is often assumed to preempt attention to stakeholders.9" As Richard
Marens and Andrew Wicks point out, "[ciourts did not historically en-
cumber corporate management with a fiduciary duty toward company
stockholders in order to privilege shareholders vis-A-vis other stake-
holder groups. Rather, it was designed to prevent self-dealing on the part
of directors and top management that fell short of criminal behavior such
as embezzlement."98
While the notion of fiduciary duty does serve to prevent self-serving
managerial behavior, it was not intended to preclude managerial consid-
eration of non-stockholder stakeholder concerns. According to Marens and
Wicks, "[w]hen conflict of interest is not at issue, no case law or corporate
statute argues that management's fiduciary duty should be equated with
a right of stockholders to oversee managerial decision making."99 They fur-
ther assert: "[Mleeting fiduciary duties to shareholders does not entail
that managers must side with shareholders and against stakeholders.
Firms have the legal autonomy to act proactively and advance the inter-
ests of a number of stakeholders simultaneously."1 0 Therefore, stock-
holders are not afforded inherent legal priority.
C. Stakeholder View of the Firm
In contrast with the stockholder view, a stakeholder view of the firm
recognizes that stockholders are but one group of relevant constituents.
According to this view, a "stakeholder" is any individual or group who affect,
or is are affected by, the operations of the firm.'1 Stockholders are stake-
holders, but so, too, are employees, customers, and a wide range of others.
Although this sort of thinking dates back at least a century, the
term "stakeholder" has only been used in this way since 1984, when
R. Edward Freeman authored Strategic Management: A Stakeholder
svSee, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
98Richard Marens & Andrew Wicks, Getting Real: Stakeholder Theory, Managerial Practice,
and the General Irrelevance of Fiduciary Duties Owed to Shareholders, 9 Bus. ETHICS Q.
273, 275 (1999).
99 Id. at 276.
1'0 Id. at 287.
'
01 R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDERAPPROACH 52 (1984).
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Approach. °2 In this book, Freeman did what no one else had yet success-
fully attempted: he confronted the vague "stakeholder" notion head-on
and developed a pragmatic, comprehensive analysis of business and its
stakeholders according to business functions, products, markets, activities,
and duties. Whereas past scholars and practitioners had referred to stake-
holders in passing or had merely assumed a shared understanding of the
term, Freeman consciously introduced and articulated the basis for a
theory that competes head-on with the commonly accepted stockholder
theory of the firm.10 3 The choice of the word "stakeholder" was intentional.
He asserted:
Words make a difference in how we see the world. By using
"stakeholder," managers and theorists alike will come to
see these groups as having a "stake." "Stakeholder" con-
notes "legitimacy," and while managers may not think that
certain groups are "legitimate" in the sense that their de-
mands on the firm are inappropriate, they had better give
"legitimacy" to these groups in terms of their ability to
affect the direction of the firm.104
Although Freeman does not prioritize stakeholder concerns, he does
indicate that they can be mapped and illustrated in a constellation vis-b-
vis their position to the firm (and each other), as shown in Figure 2.105
Through this sort of stakeholder map, a firm can identify the general
groups of stakeholders, along with the specific stakeholders that popu-
late those groups. McDonalds, for example, has general stakeholders, in-
cluding the government, competitors, employees, and customers. Within
the general group of competitors are fast food chains such as Burger King,
Wendy's, and Hardees. Stakeholder maps help reveal the level and type
of interaction with and between stakeholders. 1°6
102 Id.
103 See Radin, 700 Families to Feed, supra note 17, at 639.
104 FREEMAN, supra note 101, at 44-45.
105 Although Freeman did not initially emphasize the interrelatedness of stakeholder
concerns, there is a growing emphasis today on the relational component, between stake-
holders and the firm, as well as between stakeholders themselves. See infra Part II.D.
'
0 6 See Radin, From Imagination to Realization, supra note 76, at 31 (explaining how stake-
holder thinking dispels common misunderstandings because: (1) stockholders are not the
only legitimate stakeholders; (2) stockholder interests are not inherently primary; and
(3) stakeholder relationships are not only bilateral).
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FIGURE 2
Stakeholder View
Freeman thus formally introduced "stakeholders" in a business
context and explained their significance to business strategy. °7 He made
sense of the term's scattered history, and presented a clear and operable
framework for management to follow, he turned the vague concept of
"stakeholder" notion into the more concrete approach and began a conver-
sation about a more expansive understanding of the nature of the firm.'
107 See Eric W. Orts, A North American Legal Perspective on Stakeholder Management
Theory, in 2 PERSPECTIVES ON COMPANY LAW 165 (Fiona Patfield ed., 1997). According
to Orts, the term "stakeholder" was used on various occasions prior to 1984, but those
tend to be overlooked. Id.
10' The introduction of the term "stakeholder" provoked the development of a new stream
of scholarship. See, e.g., Thomas Donaldson & Lee E. Preston, A Stakeholder Theory of the
Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications, 20 AcAD. MGMT. REV. 65 (1995); Kevin
Gibson, The Moral Basis of Stakeholder Theory, 26 J. Bus. ETHICS 245 (2000); Andrew C.
Wicks et al., A Feminist Reinterpretation of the Stakeholder Concept, 4 BuS. ETHICS Q.
475 (1994).
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D. Relationship View of the Firm
FIGURE 3
Relationship View1 9
During the past thirty years, stakeholder theory has evolved from
the mere identification of stakeholders into a more developed inquiry
into the nature of stakeholder relationships and their influence on each
other and firms.110 Increased emphasis has been placed on the rela-
tionships themselves and on how those relationships are intermingled."'
Figure 3 illustrates a relationship view of the firm. In this rendering, the
firm is removed from the center and treated on par with other stake-
holders, all of which exist in relationships with one another. The firm,
in turn, is affected by these relationships, even those in which it is not
directly involved.
..
9 See Radin, 700 Families to Feed, supra note 17, at 643.
110 See Radin, Stakeholder Theory and the Law, supra note 66; Radin, 700 Families to
Feed, supra note 17, at 641-42; Sandra Waddock & Neil Smith, Relationships: The Real
Challenge of Corporate Global Citizenship, 105 Bus. & Soc'y REV. 47 (2000).
"' See Waddock & Smith, supra note 110, at 48-51.
20071 385
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
FIGURE 4
Stakeholder Relationships
FiniiStockholders
En nent Government
Take, as an illustration, the firm and two stakeholders: workers
(employees) and the environment." 2 As Figure 4 shows, the firm has a
relationship with workers (e.g., salary and workplace conditions). The
firm also has a relationship with the environment, such as through its use
of natural resources, its promulgation of consumerism, the donations it
makes through environment-related charities, and so on. Workers, too,
have relationships with the environment, and these relationships often
differ from those between the environment and the firm. At times, workers
and firms are divided on approaches to the natural environment. For ex-
ample, if workers have an interest in some sort of environmental concern
and the firm behaves irresponsibly toward the environment, workers can
react, either by protesting, lobbying legislators, or quitting. In the con-
verse, particularly responsible behavior by the firm can result in increas-
ed worker loyalty from environmentally-conscious workers and/or dis-
loyalty from workers who do not have an interest in the environment.
The relationships between workers, firms, and the environment are both
distinct and interrelational, with each stakeholder having separate re-
lations with each other and with others within the cluster.
112 This assumes that the environment is considered a stakeholder. See Robert A. Phillips
& Joel Reichart, The Environment as a Stakeholder? A Fairness-Based Approach, 23 J.
Bus. ETHICS 185 (2000); Mark Stank, Should Trees Have Managerial Standing? Toward
Stakeholder Status For Non-Human Nature, 14 J. Bus. ETHICS 207 (1995).
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Consider, as an example, Koramsa, a clothing manufacturing com-
pany in Guatemala. '13 Levi Strauss & Company ("LS&Co.")-a customer
and potential competitor of Koramsa-has negotiated with the govern-
ment of Guatemala in support of more stringent local labor laws compliant
with International Labor Organization ("ILO") standards. 14 Workers in
Guatemala generally (stakeholders of all the companies doing business
there) benefit from LS&Co.'s initiatives. Koramsa, a company that wishes
to operate as a responsible employer, also benefits from LS&Co.'s actions
because now all industry-related companies are required by law to pay
the costs associated with responsible employment. LS&Co. has effectively
elevated the acceptable standards of behavior for an entire industry
through its initiatives. It is essential to recognize that stakeholders have
relationships with each other and that those relationships can have an in-
fluence on the practices outside the firm itself, as LS&Co.'s actions have
here. In this situation, the effect was beneficial; the reverse could be true.
Had the reverse been true-for example, if LS&Co. was lobbying for a
negative change-Koramsa would want to be aware of this, possibly to
counter LS&Co.'s efforts.
This example of LS&Co. and Koramsa reflects a move away from
an exclusive fixation on stakeholder-specific characteristics to a more com-
plex and accurate examination of the web of relationships in which firms
are embedded and the ramifications of their intersections. Focusing on the
relationships involved and identifying areas for cooperation in this way
has proved successful in many areas, such as with issues involving globali-
zation where nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs") have spearheaded
numerous successful partnerships with corporations. The dynamics of
these sorts of relationships are still being investigated."'
113 Tara J. Radin, Levi Strauss and Co.: Implementation of Global Sourcing and Operating
Guidelines in Latin America, in RISING ABOVE THE SWEATSHOPS: INNOVATIVE APPROACHES
TO GLOBAL LABOR CHALLENGES 249, 274-80 (Laura P. Hartman, Dennis G. Arnold &
Richard E. Wokutch eds., 2003).
114 Id.
11' See, e.g., Tara J. Radin, Chiquita Brands International, Inc.: Values-Based Management
and Corporate Responsibility in Latin America, in RISING ABOVE THE SWEATSHOPS:
INNOVATIVE APPROACHES TO GLOBAL CHALLENGES, supra note 113, at 353 [hereinafter
Radin, Chiquita Brands]. See generally Petra Christmann & Glenn Taylor, Globalization
and the Environment: Strategies for International Voluntary Environmental Initiatives,
16 ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE 121 (2002); Stuart L. Hart & Mark B. Milstein, Creating
Sustainable Value, 17 ACAD. MGMT. ExECUTIVE 56 (2003); Russ Linden,A Framework for
Collaborating, 31 PUB. MANAGER 3 (2002); Waddock & Smith, supra note 110.
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The American legal system is consistent with this sort of rela-
tional stakeholder thinking.116 Considerable legislation exists that names
specific stakeholders and prioritizes their interests above those of stock-
holders.117 In fact, analysis of the law reveals the network of intercon-
nected stakeholder relationships that underlie corporations. Firms are
required to attend to the concerns of stakeholders because of the impor-
tance of these relationships to the ongoing existence of the firm.
III. THE ENVIRONMENT
During the last twenty years, diverging arguments have emerged
in support of businesses having responsibilities for the natural environ-
ment. Throughout this period, appeals have been made to both moral 18
and economic119 considerations. Among the chief concerns that have
arisen has been the legitimacy and standing of the natural environment
as a stakeholder and the ways the environment relates to business and
its various constituents.
1 20
While the status of the environment as a stakeholder has not been
fully resolved, the relationship view of the firm is helpful in addressing
some of the more pressing concerns relating to human influence on the
biosphere.
121
116 See Radin, Stakeholder Theory and the Law, supra note 66.
117See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
118 See, e.g., CHRISTINE PIERCE & DONALD VAN DE VEER, PEOPLE, PENGUINS, AND PLASTIC
TREES: BASIC ISSUES IN ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS (2d ed. 1994).
119 See, e.g., MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (1988); see also ROBERT L. NADEAU, THE WEALTH OF NATURE: How
MAINSTREAM ECONOMICS HAS FAILED THE ENVIRONMENT (2003) (arguing that environ-
mentalism and economics need to be brought together and asserting the need for an
environmentally conscious economic theory); ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV.,
INTEGRATING ENVIRONMENT AND ECONOMY: PROGRESS IN THE 1990S (1996).
12See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
121 It is not possible to attend to stakeholders without attending to stakeholders' concerns.
Thus, with respect to the environment, it matters little whether the environment itself
is considered a stakeholder or as a resource important to stakeholders; either way, a
stakeholder approach demands attention to and respect for the environment. See BILL
DEVALL & GEORGE SESSIONS, DEEP ECOLOGY: LIVING AS IF NATURE MATTERED 7 (1985)
(explaining some of the challenges associated with developing"ecological consciousness");
see also supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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A. The "Separation Thesis" and the Environment
Addressing environmental concerns from a stakeholder perspec-
tive demands addressing the so-called "separation thesis," or the notion
that business and ethics represent distinct functional areas.'22 The term
derives from an article by R. Edward Freeman, published a decade after
Strategic Management, in which he asserts that one of the key problems
in business thinking is the view that business and ethics are isolated
from one another.'23 This impoverishes both our understanding of
business and our understanding of ethics.
In most instances, this type of approach will enhance the effi-
ciency of the organization; one example of this is the compartmentali-
zation of the functional areas of business. In its efficiency, however, it
risks missing the big picture. More troubling, it can leave out altogether
certain functional areas that do not contribute obviously to the bottom
line, one of which is ethics. In terms of business and ethics, the "separa-
tion thesis" implies that business and ethics are distinct and non-
overlapping;' 24 business is concerned with the financial bottom line
without consideration of ethics, while ethics is concerned with individual
adherence to moral norms devoid of the contingencies of business. 25
The separation thesis as it relates to business and ethics is mis-
taken chiefly because the firm's bottom line is influenced by a multitude
of interrelated decisions and effects,'26 most of which are associated with
significant ethical concerns. The same holds true for issues involving the
natural environment, where, again, the effects of decisions are multiple,
interrelated, and embedded with ethical concerns.
A variation of the separation thesis also impedes proper under-
standing and application of law. In reference to business, the most common
references are to "corporate law," as if it were a separate and discrete body
of law. Although often regarded as relating only to internal governance, it
... See R. Edward Freeman, The Politics of Stakeholder Theory: Some Future Directions,
4 Bus. ETHICS Q. 409, 412-14 (1994).
123 See id. at 413 (arguing that commentators should "drop[] the idea that we can mean-
ingfully talk about business and ethics by keeping the concepts, ideas, and theories of
each autonomous").
124 Id. 412-14.
125 See id.
126 See supra Part II.C-D (discussing the stakeholder and relationship views of the firm, both
of which recognize that more than just stockholder concerns affect the firm's bottom line).
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in fact involves both internal and external relationships.'27 The reality
is that the laws of the United States are overlapping and interconnected,
just as are the relationships that comprise business.'28 Thus, while
"corporate law" refers to those laws specific to the creation of and
organization of corporations and their agents, it coexists alongside other
federal and state legislation. Viewed from this angle, it is clear that "the
law" is not partial to stockholder primacy; in fact, there are innumerable
examples of instances where the interests of specific stakeholders are pri-
oritized over the interests of stockholders.'29 An example of this occurred
in the case of Shlensky v. Wrigley, 3 ° where the court upheld the right of
managers to choose not to install bright lights in a baseball stadium-
which would have been bothersome and offensive to neighbors-even
though they would seemingly have had a positive impact on profitability
by increasing the number of games that could be played. 3 '
The "separation thesis" fails as a successful operative principle
regarding business and its legal environment.
B. Three Fundamental Questions
If the separation thesis is false and business and the natural en-
vironment are as tightly conjoined as business and ethics, then at least
three questions about how firms can and/or should address the environ-
ment in their business decision-making arise.
1. Is it Permissible for Firms to Contribute Resources to
Environmental Efforts?
This question addresses the permissibility of firms considering
the natural environment in their strategic planning, in particular with
127 See Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality
(with Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA. L.
REV. 1279, 1282 (2001) [hereinafter Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives] ("[T]he notion that the
obligation to obey the law is at the heart of the corporate contract means that corporate
law cannot be thought of as concerned only with the internal governance of the firm.").
128 See id. at 1282-83.
129 Radin, Stakeholder Theory and the Law, supra note 66, at 338-47 (noting specific
legislation such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act,
and the Family Medical Leave Act). But see Freeman, supra note 122, at 415-18 (calling for
new corporate laws that would generally mandate consideration of stakeholder interests).
130 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
131 Id.
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regard to the influence of the environment and considerations linked to
sustainability on short-term profitability. It also introduces the legitimacy
of redirecting funds that would otherwise be channeled toward stock-
holders or other direct business purposes, and the permissibility of
investing in research in areas such as alternative energy sources, engaging
in costly waste reduction procedures, manufacturing lower margin environ-
mentally-friendly products, and so forth.
While a stockholder approach to this question might simply focus
on the bottom line, a relational stakeholder approach devoid of the
"separation thesis" would charge that firms are morally responsible for
the environment as a legitimate stakeholder. It would claim, moreover,
that a firm has reciprocal relationships with a wide range of stakeholders
who care about the environment and that these concerns warrant the
firm's attention to environmental issues. Further, short-term costs can
be outweighed by long-term financial benefits.
2. Is it Consistent with Existing Laws for Firms to Contribute
Resources to Environmental Efforts?
This question asks whether it is legal for firms to contribute re-
sources to environmental efforts. In doing so, it draws attention to laws
linked to corporate governance that allow for and require significant man-
agerial discretion. In addition, specific environmental regulations explic-
itly require attention to the environment, and it can easily be argued
that investment in the environment is consistent with the spirit of those
regulations and other laws that prioritize attention to specific categories
of stakeholders.
Since companies hire managers in lieu of robots in order to access
the complex set of values and talents that humans possess, it is bene-
ficial for the firm's bottom line for decision-makers to be empowered to
integrate their inherent moral and strategic intuitions in their business
decision-making. Firms have found that attention to such concerns is not
inconsistent with profit generation. To the contrary, as numerous ex-
amples illustrate, firms increase their profitability and place themselves
at a competitive advantage when they take such considerations into
account. 132 As pharmaceutical mogul George W. Merck stated: 'We try
132 See, e.g., supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text (discussing LS&Co.'s negotiations
to secure more stringent labor laws abroad); Daniel Fisher, GE Turns Green, FORBES,
Aug. 15, 2005, available at http://www.forbes.com/business/forbes/2005/0815/080.html.
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never to forget that medicine is for the people. It is not for the profits.
The profits follow, and if we have remembered that, they have never
failed to appear."133 The same holds true for their concern for the natural
environment: it makes good business sense to support laws that encour-
age managerial discretion and creativity with regard to environmental
responsibility.
3. Could it Be Considered Mandatory for Firms to Contribute
Resources to Environmental Efforts?
This question explores the difference between permissibility and
obligation. It asks whether firms are obligated to support or enhance the
environment, and whether firms need to support other stakeholders who
are concerned about the environment. Again, firms are morally and legally
responsible to stakeholders based, at least in part, on reliance consider-
ations. Because society relies upon the natural environment and because
some natural resources are finite, it is incumbent upon society to care-
fully steward natural resources. Since firms as an aggregate use sub-
stantial amounts of natural resources, and because they often have the
power, control, and finances to protect natural resources (when compared
with isolated individuals), they are obligated to use their wherewithal
to protect natural resources for the benefit of the societies in which the
firms are embedded.' The extent and manner of these efforts is left to
the discretion of individual firms. What can be considered mandatory is
that firms have the obligation to consider the ramifications of their be-
havior on shared resources such as the natural environment.
C. Three Guiding Principles
The answers to these questions such as those above indicate that
environmental responsibility on the part of firms is desirable. These
"' Raymond V. Gilmartin, Chairman, President, and CEO of Merck & Co., Inc.,
Innovation, Ethics and Core Values: Keys to Global Success, Address before the Harvard
Magazine/Conference Board (Oct. 20, 1998), in 65 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 209, 210
(1999) (quoting George Merck, former CEO and Chairman of Merck & Co., Inc.). See also
Amory B. Lovins et al., A Road Map for Natural Capitalism, HARv. Bus. REV., May-June
1999, at 145 (illustrating how environmentally-responsible business decisions translate
into profits).
" Paul Hawken & William McDonough, Seven Steps to Doing Good Business, INC., Nov.
1993 at 79, 80 ("[Clorporations, because they are the dominant institution of the planet,
must squarely face and address the social and environmental problems that afflict
humankind.").
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answers do not, however, specify how this responsibility should manifest
itself or to what degree.
1. Firms Are Obligated to Attend to the Environment.
The first principle is straightforward: Firms are obligated to pay
attention to the environment. How they do this is their choice, left to their
discretion. At a minimum, they must comply with existing rules, regula-
tions, and industry requirements. The reasons for this mandate are twofold.
First, there is the pragmatic view: It is important for firms to at-
tend to stakeholder concerns in order to maintain satisfied stakeholders
with whom they are engaged in relationships. Second, they have moral
duties based on a principle of"do no harm."'35 Since firms are aware of
their potential for causing harm, the potential harm is to shared resources,
and because firms typically have the resources and power to mitigate
that harm, they are required to do so.
2. The Nature of a Firm's Obligation Is Generally Discretionary.
According to this principle, the nature and extent of a firm's obli-
gation-beyond mere compliance-is largely discretionary. The manner
in which a firm responds to environmental concerns is therefore flexible.
Environmentally responsible efforts on the part of firms tend to be cate-
gorized along a spectrum, displayed in Figure 5, which is both normative
and descriptive.'36 At a minimum, firms are morally obliged to "do no
harm" and remain in compliance with the law. While not specifically
definite, this position encompasses the sort of exploitation that leads to
115 See T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 224 (1998).
One principle stating our duties in such cases would hold that if you are
presented with a situation in which you can prevent something very
bad from happening, or alleviate someone's dire plight, by making only
a slight (or even moderate) sacrifice, then it would be wrong not to do so.
Id.
'
6 It is not uncommon to refer to environmental ethics in terms of"shades of green." See,
e.g., NEIL CUNNINGHAM ET AL., SHADES OF GREEN: BUSINESS, REGULATION, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (2003); R. Edward Freeman et al., Shades of Green: Business, Ethics and
the Environment, in THE BUSINESS OF CONSUMPTION: ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS AND THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY339 (Laura Westra & Patricia H. Werhane eds., 1998); Kate Rawles, The
Missing Shade of Green, in ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 535 (David Schmidtz & Elizabeth
Willott eds., 2002).
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tragedies such as "Love Canal."137 It does not mean that firms are not
permitted to partake in the earth's resources, but that they should do so
moderately and in accordance with existing laws.
FIGURE 5
Shades of Green
Pr
t1
LII /1
z
In the indeterminate middle is the notion that some firms choose
to be proactive in deciding to prevent harm while others are merely re-
active. The proactive approach considers investments in research, waste
management, development of environmentally responsible products, and
so forth. A number of companies have engaged in this approach and have
adopted systemic product and/or process redesigns to make positive
contributions to society and the environment.13 While some companies
engage in such undertakings because they consider it their moral obli-
gation, others do so for self-interested reasons and find that doing so gives
them a competitive advantage.139
... See Eckardt C. Beck, The Love Canal Tragedy, EPA J., Jan. 1979, http://www.epa.gov/
history/topics/lovecanal/O1.htm (discussing the effects of the chemical pollution and the
protective measures put in place by various legislation).
138 See, e.g., Peter Day, Presenter, BBC Radio 4 and BBC World Service, General Electric
Goes Green, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4204194.stm (last updated Sept. 1, 2005)
(describing General Electric's "Ecomagination" project).
139 Id.
Do no hain'm
Firim's
Approach
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3. There Are Circumstances That Create Mandatory Obligations
for Firm Behavior Toward the Environment Beyond Mere
Compliance.
The third principle suggests that there are situations where a
firm's obligation could be considered mandatory. Such situations are not
the norm, but occur in circumstances when a particular firm is specially
suited for the role.
In general, it is unusual for society to impose positive obligations,
particularly on firms. Firms represent voluntary participation in the econ-
omy. In other words, investors and owners are motivated to participate
generally by the opportunity to profit from certain enterprises. It is
therefore generally considered inappropriate to impose correlative
burdens that might detract from investment in such enterprises and
thereby interfere with the economy.
At the same time, some degree of responsibility needs to be
assigned in order to remedy harm or potential harm. Economists such as
Ronald Coase 4 ° and Guido Calabresi'.. have argued in favor of efficiency
in lieu of attempting to identify fault. According to their views, what mat-
ters is identifying the entity that can most efficiently resolve a problem,
not necessarily the one that contributed the most or bears the greatest
responsibility.
Coase has argued that firms exist only because of their inherent
efficiency.'42 It would seem, then, that coordinated and/or collective cor-
porate initiatives will and should arise when they are recognized as more
efficient than costly alternatives.'4 3 Further, Calabresi has asserted that
an effective and efficient way of dealing with harm is to impose the burden
on the individual or entity who or which is in the best position to discover
the problem and most cheaply avoid harm.'" In fact, while it can be argued
that we all aware of environmental harm, corporations are in the best
14 See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937) (arguing that
firms emerge because of their efficiency when intra-firm transactions are more efficient
and less costly than external transactions).
141 See, e.g., GuIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS (1970).
142 Coase, supra note 140, at 390-98.
" While it may be costly and inefficient for a single corporation to take responsibility for
the natural environment, as more corporations participate in sustainability efforts, the
pendulum swings. It may become more costly not to participate, particularly if customers
and other stakeholders recognize the importance of sustainability.1 See generally CALABREsI, supra note 141.
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position to avoid such harm because they are the ones engaging in some
of the most destructive behavior. It would thus seem logical and appro-
priate to impose on corporations a mandatory obligation beyond mere com-
pliance when they are specifically in the best position to avoid the harm.
This leads to a set of criteria that can frame those situations in
which there can be construed a mandatory obligation for environmental
responsibility.145 First, there must be a specific need for change as
manifested in actual or foreseeable harm. Second, there must be prox-
imity, through either a direct or indirect link; the firm must be a partic-
ipant in the problem or a direct beneficiary. Third, the firm must have
the capability to change products or processes without it becoming overly
cumbersome to the firm. Lastly, there must be some sort of comparative
advantage. The firm must be particularly situated to address the harm.
When these four criteria are met, it can be said that a firm has a specific
obligation to engage in environmentally responsible behavior to address
harm to the natural environment.
D. Sustainability and Fiduciary Duties
Corporations often resist the imposition of mandatory duties, par-
ticularly those that appear to challenge the primary fiduciary duty (trust-
based obligation) managers have to stockholders. This resistance mani-
fests itself as a pervasive corporate reluctance to address a wide range
of social issues that corporations are well suited to address. On the one
hand, it seems reasonable for managers to construe their fiduciary duties
narrowly in terms of profit maximization. At the same time, however, re-
sponsible managers cannot reasonably escape consideration of the stake-
holder concerns that indirectly (if not directly) affect the bottom line.
Further, managers can actually leave stockholders vulnerable to
legal liability by not paying close attention to stakeholder concerns through
corporate violations or neglect. On this basis, Cynthia A. Williams and
John M. Conley have argued that managers are responsible for con-
sidering human rights for example.'46
.
45 For a similar approach to mandatory duties in the area of corporate responsibility, see
generally Thomas W. Dunfee, Do Firms With Unique Competencies for Rescuing Victims
of Human Catastrophes Have Special Obligations? Corporate Responsibility and theAIDS
Catastrophe in Sub-Saharan Africa, 16 BUs. ETHICS Q. 185 (2006).
'" Williams & Conley, Human Rights, supra note 27 ("Given the continuing vitality of
ATCA litigation, directors' fiduciary duties now include a duty to be aware of human rights
risks and potential violations within a company's global operations and to develop policies
and management procedures to reduce the risks of such violations.").
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Not unlike stakeholders, the manager's ancillary duties sometimes
seem unrelated to the firm. Just as with attention to stakeholder concerns,
however, managers are remiss if they overlook or minimize the impor-
tance of those duties. Examples of such duties include the oversight to
make sure companies are good neighbors, are providing jobs for people
in the locales in which companies are situated, and are making sure to
contribute to (or at least not diminish) the physical infrastructure of their
host communities. Another important duty managers have is to make sure
their companies positively influence (or at least are not diminishing) the
natural environment.
In all situations, managers have fiduciary duties indirectly re-
lated to their duty to stockholders. This is so for no other reason than that
managers must be concerned with the well-being of stockholders, and that
stockholders can be held legally liable for their neglect of the surround-
ing community or the natural environment.147
In short, the environment is an inescapable business concern
today.14 While corporate responses are currently voluntary, the respon-
sibilities of corporate managers are not: they are imperative. As Bruce
Ledewitz warns:
The state of the world is not good, or, since the world will
be here long after we're gone, I should say the state of the
world upon which people depend is not good. Long predicted
and feared environmental problems are now cascading
upon us. Not a day goes by, it seems, without news of cata-
strophic global warming or collapsed fisheries or depleted
resources or diminished topsoil or lack of fresh water or
diminished biological diversity-and on and on.149
If Ledewitz is correct that the natural environment is being harmed by
large-scale human actions, then corporations are likely to be held account-
able, and this imposes on managers a moral duty based on their fun-
damental fiduciary obligation to stockholders to protect the natural
147 Cindy A. Schipani, Taking it Personally: Shareholder Liability for Corporate Environ-
mental Hazards, 27 IOwA J. CORP. L. 29, (2001) (arguing the importance of corporations
taking environmental considerations into account, even in the absence of specific laws,
because law is a moving target). Since the 1990s, there has been criminal enforcement
of American environmental statutes. See Silecchia, supra note 46, at 583-84.
148 BUCHHOLZ, supra note 18, at 2. See also Monsma & Buckley, supra note 29.
14' Bruce Ledewitz, The Constitutions of Sustainable Capitalism and Beyond, 29 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 229 (2002).
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environment.' Beyond that, failure to address environmental concerns
can result in financial distress for the firm, including bankruptcy.' If
it is the fiduciary responsibility of managers to protect the interests (and
profits) of stockholders, the only way they can do that is to consider how
the firm affects, and is affected by, the natural environment.'52 Not only
can the corporation's approach to sustainability influence short- and
long-term profits, the corporation faces expensive tort litigation, while
stockholders face criminal sanctions, if the corporation does not behave
responsibly.
153
E. Stakeholders, Sustainability, and Citizenship
To understand fully the manager's responsibilities for the natural
environment, it is important to be familiar with the central goal of the
environmental movement, that is, the notion of "sustainability."
Sustainability, as it is used here, is the integrated, systemic, last-
ing effect of attention to the natural environment. It encompasses every-
thing from the local neighborhood to the planet and the well-being of all
living things. It emphasizes investments in the future rather than one-
time actions. In addition, it reflects a process or way of thinking about
environmental issues and responsibilities.
50 See, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 5
DUKE L.J. 879, 882 (1988) ("The fiduciary's duties go beyond mere fairness and honesty; they
oblige him to further the beneficiary's best interests."). Further, "[fliduciary obligation has a
number of characteristics that classify it among the law's most exotic species." Id. at 923.
... Joanne Grossman & J.T. Smith, Winning Strategies: Beating the Odds When You're
Betting the Company, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 1997, at 42. See also Russ Banham,
Hazards of the Deal, CFO MAG., May 2000, at 91 (pointing out that firms are now
investing in insurance because of the recognized risks linked to environmental concerns).
15 2 See, e.g., Shameek Konar & Mark A. Cohen, Information as Regulation: The Effect of
Community Right to Know Laws on Toxic Emissions, 32 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 109,
112 (1997) ("'Green consumers' may decide to boycott products of high polluting firms or
otherwise look for alternatives."). It is, therefore, essential for managers to take these
sorts of considerations into account if, for no other reason, because they have a significant
impact on the corporation's bottom line.
'
53 See Nancy K Kubasek et al., The Role of Criminal Enforcement in Attaining Environ-
mental Compliance in the United States and Abroad, 7 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 122 (2000).
"4 See BRIAN NATTRASS & MARY ALTOMARE, THE NATURAL STEP FOR BUSINESS: WEALTH,
ECOLOGY AND THE EVOLUTIONARY CORPORATION 29 (1999) ("It may not be possible to do
everything you would like to do right away, but at least make a start and do what you
can-now!").
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Sustainability is similar to stakeholder thinking (particularly the
relationship view of stakeholder theory) in that both build upon existing
relationships, interconnectedness, and synergies.'55 The key concept in
both is the notion of "systems thinking,"15 which provides both the ratio-
nale for why corporations need to pay attention to sustainability and the
ways they might go about doing so.'57 Each corporation is itself embed-
ded in a web of relationships, and at the same time, part of a "networked
economy."' Stakeholder thinking and sustainability also overlap with
the concept of "citizenship," which concentrates on the responsibilities of
individuals in social (community-based) and political systems.'59 The em-
phasis here lies on the individual's rights and responsibilities as they are
derived from the individual's affiliation with particular communities or
social systems. According to this understanding, protection of the non-
human natural environment reflects a common concern regarding re-
sources shared by a social system or systems. As a result, the responsi-
bility likewise becomes shared by the citizens of a particular place.
At present, individual citizenship has made room to accommodate
corporate citizenship. Borrowing from common understandings of indi-
vidual citizenship, the notion of corporate citizenship holds that business
organizations have rights and responsibilities comparable to those of indi-
viduals.' This means that corporate citizens are expected to contribute
... See Benedict Sheehy, Scrooge-The Reluctant Stakeholder: Theoretical Problems in the
Shareholder-Stakeholder Debate, 14 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REV. 193,240 (2005) ("The current
and expanding stakeholder views may permit us to limit the externalizing of social and
environmental costs done in favor of maximizing shareholder wealth, and ultimately save
our planet from destruction by the reluctant shareholder.").
156 See, e.g., JEFFREY PFEFFER, THE HUMAN EQUATION: BUILDING PROFITS BY PUTTING
PEOPLE FIRST (1998); Alexander Laszlo & Stanley Krippner, Systems Theories: Their
Origins, Foundations, and Development, in SYSTEMS THEORIES AND A PRIORI ASPECTS OF
PERCEPTION (J. Scott Jordan ed., 1998); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments
for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1195 (2002) ("Team production analysis
of the corporation begins by recognizing that corporate production often requires inputs
from a number of different groups. Shareholders alone cannot make a firm-creditors,
employees, managers, and even local governments often must make contributions in order
for an enterprise to succeed.").
157 See, e.g., Alyson C. Flournoy, In Search of an Environmental Ethic, 28 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 63 (2003).
158 Gary S. Guzy, Reconciling Environmentalist and Industry Differences: The New
Corporate Citizenship "Race to the Top"?, 17 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 409, 414 (2002).
159 See SIMON ZADEK, THE CIVIL CORPORATION: THE NEW ECONOMY OF CORPORATE
CITIZENSHIP (2001).
160 See, e.g., Carey, supra note 57.
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to the communities in which they operate and to be considerate of their
interactions with other community members. By implication, this means
that they are expected to be respectful of the claims of others with re-
gard to the use of natural resources and the shared reliance on the envi-
ronment. Corporate citizens take on these sorts of responsibilities, not
necessarily because of particular feelings about the natural environment,
but because of the recognized interdependence of community members
and the need for an overall respect for such shared, finite resources. 6 '
IV. STAKEHOLDERS, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND GOOD BusINEss
DECISION-MAKING
A key contribution of stakeholder thinking to environmentalism
and sustainability is the way it assigns responsibilities to firms. Stake-
holder thinking is particularly helpful in showing the webs of moral and
legal duties that intersect. Stakeholder thinking also reveals how firms
have moral responsibilities to stakeholders in general. 2
161 For examples of this progressive corporate law, see Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives, supra
note 127; Williams & Conley, Human Rights, supra note 27. See also Margaret M. Blair
& Lynn A. Stout,A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247,250-51
(1999) (contending that, since "corporate assets belong not to shareholders but to the
corporation[,]" all stakeholders share "an interest in [the] enterprise's success").
'
62 See, e.g., JOSHUA DANIEL MARGOLIS & JAMES PATRICK WALSH, PEOPLE AND PROFITS?
THE SEARCH FOR A LINK BETWEEN A COMPANY'S SOCIAL AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
(2001); LYNN SHARP PAINE, VALUE SHIFT: WHY COMPANIES MUST MERGE SOCIAL AND
FINANCIAL IMPERATIVES TO ACHIEVE SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE (2003); Sandra A Waddock
& Samuel B. Graves, The Corporate Social Performance-Financial Performance Link, 18
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 303 (1997); see also Marc Gunther, Tree Huggers, Soy Lovers, and
Profits, FORTUNE, June 23, 2003, at 98 (contending that, even in the absence of abundant
empirical evidence, there are strong arguments in favor of corporate social responsibility,
particularly with regard to sustainability and the natural environment).
The lack of hard evidence doesn't mean the theory of corporate respon-
sibility is wrong. If reputation and brand matter as much as experts say,
companies with a mission that goes beyond making money will do better
when it comes to recruiting, retaining, and engaging their workers and
attracting loyal customers.
Id. at. 104. See also Radin, Chiquita Brands, supra note 115 (illustrating the interconnec-
tedness between environmental concerns, social responsibility in general, and good business
practices). In the example of Chiquita, that company's change in perspective (in terms of
becoming environmentally responsible) has caused tremendous fallout throughout the entire
banana industry, namely that expectations are evolving to virtually require similar approach-
es be taken by Chiquita's competitors; however, Chiquita now has a head start. See id.
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An important aspect of linking stakeholder theory to the envi-
ronment emerges in its challenge to conventional ways of thinking about
business. Discussions about sustainability and the environment empha-
size the multiple ways business negatively influence the biosphere using
their current practices. This invites discussion about innovative, non-
conventional ways of satisfying human wants and needs and challenges
prevailing mental models with the potential for new business opportuni-
ties. Specific examples illustrate how environmental responsibility can
turn into a competitive advantage.'63
A. The Bottom of the Pyramid
FIGURE 6
Economic Pyramid..
One of the chief proponents of the need to reconceptualize business
strategy is C.K. Prahalad, who argues that the oft-assumed target of busi-
ness is misplaced.'65 Prahalad maintains that most businesses ifocus on
.
63 See, e.g., Pratima Bansal, Evolving Sustainably: A Longitudinal Study of Corporate
Sustainable Development, 26 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 197 (2005); see also Gunther, supra
note 162, at 98 ("When DuPont makes a strategic decision, ... the company poses a
question... [that] should be on every 21st-century CEO's agenda: 'How do you bring the
economics together with the environmental and societal needs so that they are all part
of your business strategies?").
164 For a more detailed depiction of the "economic pyramid," see C.K. PRAHALAD, THE
FORTUNE AT THE BOTTOM OF THE PYRAMID: ERADICATING POvERTY THROUGH PROFITS 4,
fig.1.1 (2005).
165 See id.
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providing goods and services to the middle and upper class and overlook
the poor.'66 Using real-world examples, he argues that the poorest socio-
economic group affords businesses with tremendous opportunities in terms
of profit, market penetration, global expansion, and so on. In economic
terms, as the pyramid in Figure 6 illustrates, the poor represent a lucra-
tive and virtually untapped resource for businesses. In Prahalad's words:
If we stop thinking of the poor as victims or as a burden
and start recognizing them as resilient and creative en-
trepreneurs and value-conscious consumers, a whole new
world of opportunity will open up. Four billion poor can be
the engine of the next round of global trade and prosper-
ity.... What is needed is a better approach to help the
poor, an approach that involves partnering with them to
innovate and achieve sustainable win-win scenarios where
the poor are actively engaged and, at the same time, the
companies providing products and services to them are
profitable.167
Prahalad's suggestion merits serious consideration because there
are many more people at the bottom of the pyramid than elsewhere, espe-
cially at the top.' In addition, many of the poorest people have funda-
mental needs that can be addressed without large capital investments.
These can be satisfied in many instances by the economies of scale
afforded by globalization, for example. Moreover, attention to the poor
helps elevate the standards of the socioeconomically disadvantaged to
not only alleviate widespread hardships, but also to potentially relieve
the stress on social welfare systems.
Muhammad Yunus echoes many of Prahalad's sentiments, and
he gives testimony to the wealth of profits that can be generated at the
bottom of the pyramid through his experience with Grameen Bank of
Bangladesh. This micro-credit institution elevates the status of impov-
erished people, especially women, by making small loans without the re-
quirement of collateral." 9 The community itself is collateral. Although
'" See id. at 1-4.
167 Id. at 1-4.
16' See id. at 4. But see Aneel Karnani, Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid: A Mirage 2
(Ross School of Bus., U. of Mich., Working Paper No. 1035, 2006) (asserting that viewing
the poor as "consumers" is insufficient; to make a difference, the poor must be turned
into "producers").
..
9Grameen Bank, http'//www.grameen-info.orgbank/index.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2007).
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the system is at the same time simple in concept and complex in its ren-
dering, the underlying premise is that poor people have skills that are
underutilized because of their lack of capital. By providing them with
capital, poor people are able to act on their potential, and this thereby
facilitates the prosperity of their families and, by extension, their com-
munities. By most accounts, the Grameen Bank is regarded as a tremen-
dous success, and the notion of micro-lending has spread worldwide. 7 °
Grameen has done well as an institution, too, in that during the three
years between 2002 and 2005, the bank's assets nearly doubled from
$361 million to $678 million.'71 As of 2005, the bank boasted 5.58 million
borrowers, 1,735 branches, and a 21.22% return on equity.
17 2
B. Cradle-to- Cradle
While Prahalad and Yunus provide examples from less developed
countries, William McDonough offers an alternative perspective on how
organizations can approach sustainability with an eye toward profits in
developed countries such as the United States. He advocates what he calls
a "cradle-to-cradle" approach that is essentially a comprehensive redesign
of products and/or processes. 173 In contrast to traditional "cradle-to-grave"
approaches where resources are used once and then discarded, the cradle-
to-cradle approach advocates the use of perpetually recyclable or com-
postable materials.'74 According to McDonough, "Pollution is a symbol
of design failure," and ways to reduce wasteful pollution are ways to in-
crease production efficiency.
17 5
Small and large companies alike have adopted McDonough's ap-
proach to sustainable business.'76 One of the most impressive examples
of the implementation of his approach is the site restoration of Ford Motor
170 See generally Kofi A. Annan, The U.N. Seceretary General Messages on the Lunch
[sic] by H.E.The Prime Minister Of Bangladesh of the International Year Of Microcredit
(n.d.), http://www.grameen-info.org/Media/mediadetail2.htm.
171 Past Nine Years of Grameen Bank (1997-2005), http://www.grameen-info.orgbank/
nineyearGBTaka.htm (last modified July 24, 2006).
172 See id.
171 See Jena McGregor, William McDonough: Design for Living, BUS. WK., June 12,2006,
at 18.
174 Id.
17' Rebecca Smith, Beyond Recycling: Manufacturers Embrace 'C2C'Design, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 3, 2005, at B1 (quoting William McDonough).
176 See id.
40320071
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
Company's River Rouge Complex in Michigan, which reflects cradle-to-
cradle thinking throughout the entire facility."' Kodak's single-use camera
is another example of cradle-to-cradle product design. 78 In this case,
Kodak redesigned its production system to account for the entire life cycle
of cameras. Kodak now not only produces cameras, it also recovers them
at the end of their lifecycle in an elaborate continuous loop system. 179
Not unlike Prahalad's "Bottom of the Pyramid" and Yunus'
Grameen Bank, McDonough's "cradle-to-cradle" design reconceives the
notion of a business externality. Manufacturers often create cost reduc-
tions by pushing nonessential processes onto society by rendering them
external to the company (hence the term "externality"). Waste, for example,
may be externalized in this manner as pollution. McDonough, in contrast,
espouses the view that companies can and should take ownership of
their processes.' He thus shows companies how to internalize processes
formally considered waste-producing. "' Accordingly, he argues that such
processes result in win-win situations-long term profits for companies
coupled with advances toward sustainability-that benefit society.182
C. Restorative Commerce
Perhaps the most dramatic application of McDonough's ideas is
found in the "restorative" commercial approach implemented by Interface,
Inc. This company, founded by Ray Anderson, is a global leader in the de-
sign, production, and sale of carpeting.8 3 Unlike other carpet producers,
Interface attempts to be a good citizen of the earth by instituting restorative
commercial systems.' In Anderson's words, "[b] eing restorative means
to put back more than we take, and to do good to the Earth, not just no
harm."8 5 Interface's goals are long-term and, although it is recognized as
177 McGregor, supra note 173, at 18.
178 David Newcorn, Cradle-to-Cradle Catches on, PACKAGING WORLD MAG., Sept. 2003,
at 107, available at http://www.packworld.com/view-16493.
179 id.
180 See McGregor, supra note 177, at 18.
181 See id.
18 2 See generally id. (describing the environmental benefits and cost savings of the facilities
McDonough has designed).
"s Interface Inc., Who We Are, http://www.ifsia.com/who/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2007);
Interface Inc., Who We Are: Founder, httpJ/www.ifsia.com/who/founder.html (last visited
Mar. 1, 2007).
184 Interface Inc., Our Goals, http://www.ifsia.com/goals/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2007).
185 ANDERSON, supra note 11, reprinted at Ray C. Anderson: An Attempt at Sustainable De-
velopment, http'//onlineethics.org/environment/rcanderson.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2007).
[Vol. 31:363
STAKEHOLDERS AND SUSTAINABILITY
a leader in sustainable business today, the company has not achieved its
goals yet. Interface has, nevertheless, made significant progress from the
time it was not at all "green."
It has been only about a decade since Anderson spearheaded an
effort to harness technology and transform carpet-making into a process
less resource-dependent. The catalyst for this initiative was Paul Hawken's
The Ecology of Commerce."6 Hawken's words stunned Anderson into
recognizing his company's destructive role toward the environment." 7 As
he grew to view himself as a plunderer of the earth's resources, he imme-
diately set about reducing his company's petroleum dependence.' For
Anderson, this sort of approach was not just the morally right thing to do,
it was also good for business.8 9
In 2005, Interface introduced a production process that enabled
the company to recycle old carpeting. 9 ° Interface now considers this a
dream come true .... We can now mine the landfill instead
of siphoning off more oil. But it's also good business. Now,
we're not just willing to take back old carpet, we're eager
to take it because Cool Blue [the production equipment re-
sponsible for the recycling process] can turn it into profit. 191
Interface has inherited a rich legacy from Anderson. His company
has turned a product into a service, and now, instead of selling carpet
tiles, Interface leases them. As carpet tiles wear out, they are replaced
and the old tiles are remanufactured as part of an endless loop pro-
cess.' 92 Waste has been reduced and this has dramatically decreased the
company's reliance on raw materials.' 93
The experience at Interface has been tremendously positive. In
the five years between 2000 and 2005, Interface tripled its use of
recycled or bio-based raw materials and grew its use of renewable energy
' HAWKEN, supra note 29 (arguing that a connection exists between the health of the
environment and the well-being of the economy).
..
7 See ANDERSON, supra note 11.
188 Id.
189 Id.
"0 INTERFACE, INC., FASHION FORWARD: INTERFACE, INC. 2005 ANNUAL REPORT 12 (2005).
191 Id. at 12.
192 Interface Inc., The Seven Steps: Closing the Loop, http://www.interfacesustainability.
com/seven.html (follow "closing the loop" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 1, 2007).
'
9
' See generally INTERFACE, INC., supra note 190, at 12.
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from 6.4% to 21.7%.1 4 At the same time, it cut its waste (material sent
to landfills) by 50%. Net sales are growing and the company is looking
healthier and healthier.'96 In the end, Interface exemplifies the value-
psychically, environmentally, and financially--of the greening of business.
V. Bottom Line
All of these examples reflect the value of sustainable business to
the financial bottom line of organizations, communities, and the globe.
They also illustrate that businesses do not need laws to provide workable
models of sustainable business.'97 Moreover, they illustrate how reliance
on the law can be problematic in that it remains short-sighted and flawed.
While laws might have failed businesses, the inherent problem is not the
law: it is the reliance of businesses upon laws and the expectation that
legislation can and should determine responsible decision-making.
Moving forward, it is possible to continue to strive to improve the
legal framework, but there will virtually always be an inevitable "lag
effect." An alternative is thus to endeavor to influence the norms of accept-
able and expected business behavior. Fiduciary duties, prescribed by law,
are interpreted according to existing norms. In effect, these norms-the
fiduciary duties of managers and corporations-become the foundation
for corporations and managers living up to and abiding by society's stan-
dards and expectations. 198
Environmental responsibility is about justice, not charity. As a
corporate citizen that can and does affect the lives of others, the firm has
an obligation to act as a responsible citizen by acting in such a way as to
protect the natural environment. Furthermore, good business decision-
making--decisions that can translate into profits-demands attention
to stakeholder concerns about issues such as the environment.
194 Id. at 12.
9 Id. at 12.
196 Id. at 10-12.
197 But see Greenfield, New Principles for Corporate Law, supra note 3 (arguing for the
adoption of five new foundational principles in corporate law).
198 See Williams & Conley, Human Rights, supra note 27, at 104.
"Law" presumes enforcement by the state; a "norm" is separate from
the state and its enforceability is less certain and more complex. In
small-scale societies, things like shaming, fear of bad reputation, and
the possibility of needed sustenance being withheld (as in a reciprocal
economy) are all robust mechanisms for the enforcement of norms.
406 [Vol. 31:363
2007] STAKEHOLDERS AND SUSTAINABILITY 407
It is important to keep in mind that, while corporations are a
legal fiction, the individuals who populate them are very real. While the
corporation might not care about the environment as human beings do,
its stakeholders are dependent upon a habitable environment for their
survival. Sustainability, then, is not just the way of the future; it is what
will provide a future.
